Inducing paradigmatic meaning-tags from the semantic and semiotic, morphological and non-morphological, mechanism and mechanism-independent hypermedia-oriented socio-ecologies
The aim of this paper will be to borrow concepts of systematic processing, founded in Connectionist research which seeks to explicate and model cognitive capacities of minds through systematic tasks and context-norms (use of context units), to formalize psychological access within a domain of the representational. At root, what becomes represented is a hypermedia-affordance; that is, the structure of the affordance is given as a substrate dedicated to the syntactic processing of syntactic structures from which the properties of productivity, systematicity, inference coherence and compositionality emerge (or at any rate, are said to be emergent properties of a systematic task or set of systematic tasks taken in the aggregate). Importantly, it should be noted that I use “systematic task” as one conforming to constraints provided by H-Factor; or, in other words, I am making an identitifcation between the properties “afforded” by syntactic processing and link relation. For instance, a “link relation” has any variable complexity in its syntax: it can contain periods (
.), forward-slashes (
/), plus signs (
+), pipes (
|), question mark (
?), ampersand (
&), and so on. Some of these symbols, or special characters, have meaning in the context of URL processing by the client. At the same time certain forms of repetition can be take on a “special” status: a string “EGGDFF” might represent musical notes to be played or “XXOO” might be a sequence of steps to take in a Tic-Tac-Toe game.
Consider some examples:
The challenge of hypermedia-orientation is that it broadens the register of “syntactic processing” of hidden inputs to include both representational and psychological access. Psychological access refers to states of cognitive process which can be determined through valid steps of non-metacomputational procedure, whereas representation access refers to states of application process which can be discovered through evolutionary augmented pathways in computation. Fundamentally the goal will be to use special structures inherent to link relation through the placement of special characters such that intentional, or mechanism-independent, structure may emerge from their grammatical tendencies and capacities. Modal force is the textual Programming includes many paradigmatic orientations toward language itself: the distinction between use-mention, object- and metalanguage, formal and natural, various kinds of intentionality-constrained, and therefore context-dependent, quotation, and so on. It will be key to inform our notion of systematic process in such a way that the constraints specified in the Hypermedia Factors enable learning through conceptual prehension of signs as bodies with spatiotemporal and nomological aspects.
A gradient of specificity, or medium specificity (Fazi) will be defined in terms of how C-BDI (computational belief-desire-intention) agents are modeled as using systematic processing over mechanism and mechanism-independent structure made available the in hypertextual domain: textual constructs will be regarded as input which may imply an intentional structure such that an intentional stance may be taken up between autonomous agents. Through the medium specific we will be able to consider as emergent legitimacy, status and authority (DeLanda) in the computational context. We can envisage computation as directing its own forms of legitimacy or even solidarity, for instance. But we must make the distinction clear: legitimacy is an emergent property but its gradience is the “resource.” Such a property may change or obtain, but it does not run out in the same way that a well becomes emptied of water. A well may lack or see a reduction in a resource relative to it apparent structure, but we would not say that emptiness or high-capacity emerged from its structure. DeLanda describes “a gradient of legitimacy” developing from a process of kinds of accumulation such that the gradience conditions the tendency and capacity of a given organizational complex in its behavior insofar as change or evolution takes place. Taking from Fazi’s stance, and combining with DeLanda’s, there are mechanistic phenomena of evolutionary structure (variation, selection, mutation, etc.) as well as mechanism-independent structure (potentiality, possibility space, tendency, capacity) defined in such a way that what is absent, or unrealized, over a period in the evolution of a system plays just as much a role in its constrained determination of statistically realized events. For example, in Western societies modes of order, even civility, are conditioned by the mere potentiality of enforcement under certain contexts; i.e., enforcers or punishers need not act in every instance that a legal rule has been flouted. Kantian equilibria rarely exist from (see John E. Roemer). At the same time, it is granted that some modes of commerce operate beneath the optionality or opticality or operational mechanisms expressed as encompassing the space of legal actions made available to “good” and “bad” actors alike.
The first task will be to show that the accumulation or progress over a link relation’s string can be used to sufficiently distinguish between psychological states and representational states. A psychological attitude toward a proposition will be said to be in a given state at a certain time, t, internal to the act of accumulation of the input string. The detection of grammatical structure must allow for our system to distinguish between certain propositional forms and non-propositional forms (like credences, probabilistic contents, etc.). Typically propositions are treated as a most basic element over which a propositional calculus is operative: they possess both a syntactic and a semantic structure which can be mapped such that deterministic as well as probabilistic outcomes can be achieved. Our concept of a “non-standard link relation” present the challenge of deriving semantic meaning from syntactic structure in such a way that relational forms like Mary loves Bob, Mary believes that Mary loves Bob, etc. can be indeterminate meaning which is shared in the understanding of an arbitrary number of nodes connected to the network. When we say “psychological access” what we mean is that the layer of simple relations like “loves,” or even acts, like “opening” (Mary [is] opening the door) expresses at a different level from those involving propositional attitudes (“believes”, “fears”, “knows”, and so on.). Bob may love Susan, and further, Kevin, and Jerry, and many others. However the relationships here are not immediately accessible to Mary merely because they exist within a graph. It’s important to be clear that we are indeed presenting a structured experience but at a different level of representation and also kind of representation. Naturally, an expression like Mary believes that Mary loves Bob associable to a particular agent given an intentional projection, however within the graph of relations that represents the simple proposition, Mary loves Bob, there is a break between conceptual and relational worlds: the simple proposition itself lacks intentional direction toward its parent opaque context. Nothing within the structure of the belief itself conditions the possibility of the truth of the simple proposition. Their relational relatedness is conditioned by an existential correlation between the believer and the believed (whatever the believed happens to be, whether a proposition or not). More important is the fact that Mary believing that Mary loves Bob does not entail that anyone else so bears the same belief; in a sense Mary forms a network with herself as a singular node which contains a network of relations representing her knowledge at a given time. What is possible to express is the conjunction of propositional attitudes in a certain way, however the state of a network of attitudes may be much less reliably determined than the state of an ensemble of simple relations like loves and between.
position ----- momentum
The URL already has a well-defined semantic structure, defined by timbl in th Axioms of the Web. But we want to add a temporal dimension to the mapping of standard and non-standard link relations. Fundamentally we have two distinct, irreducible ways of conceiving “temporal relation”: on the one hand, we have (bi- or tri-) temporal modeling, — more generally, Modal modeling; i.e. Modal Time (MT), modal temporalization; Nick Land might call this “templexity” or Laruelle “time without temporalization” since at this scheme we are primarily managing chance, not change— , which includes transactionality (Transaction Time, TT), validity (Valid Time, VT) and decisionality (Decision Time, DT), and on the * Series modeling, by way of John McTaggart, which includes the A Series (absolute or atomic past, present, future points or events which change into others), B Series (points conceived as occuring before or after others), C Series (grouped points, which can be expressed as morphisms) and D/E Series (biological time; i.e., punctuated, co-negotiated bio-synchronic interactive time) — where we are primarily managing change, not chance. By saying these conceptual schemes are irreducible, there is no clear categorical means by which we can say one is embedded in the other except through aesthetical authority; from Beatrice M Fazi’s work, Contingent Computation: the aesthetic grounds the logic. Understanding this, we may find whatever non-metacomputational axiology we choose to wed these two conceptual schemes, or orientational models (metamodels?), to be entirely arbitrary. For instance, we could say that elements or an ensemble of elements constituting any realization of * Series model can be enclosed within a stated category of Modal Time; so, an expression of series, whatever the sort, can be “stored” in virtue of modal states of time; e.g., an A Series can be stored for DT, or TT, and so on. Conversely, we could store all Decisional temporal events in an entire A Series, or we could store Transactional temporal events in respective E Series agents which might punctuation and co-negotiate “what time it is.”
Let’s put this matter into practical terms, following the given “domain model” of Standard Link Relations (SLR) for an API Endpoint called
All well and good. What concept I’d like to bring to the foreground is the concept of a “continuation token,” however instead of thinking of continuity of a decomposed or decompositional distributed computation, we are thinking in terms of temporalization (change) and time-without-temporalization (or without change, but with chance). As noted earlier we already understand the URL structure to have been well understood and defined: it consists of what is structurally and ontologically a Subject, an Object and a Predicate (or modality). What could this mean? A domain (subject) has an entity or value (object) that, depending on the HTTP verb used realizes a certain state (predicate or mode of the object as it relates to the subject who has provided it in virtue of the HTTP protocol) which should be stored in the cached client’s means of storage (in the cached representation, deferred; i.e., LocalStorage or not; i.e., the MIME Type, as data). Recall that REST requires stateless server as a constaint. Fundamentally this establishes a decoupled node-to-node interaction (we could conceive of the “stateless server” as actually a horizontalized peer in a mesh, etc.). In this case, the problem before us is continuity, but we could broaden our conceptual scope to the idea of a Context Unit, or context in general, as the kind of notion that continuity falls under. At this level, we want to consider: Other than continuity how to we conceive events, since formally continuity indicates a continuity of events. So we are broadening our conceptual scope to regard context token, not merely one kind of context, namely continuity, but all the ways in which contextualization takes place. What are the other kinds of “context-sensitivity”? Here we suggest genericity, dialecticality and differentiality, along with continuity. Let’s say here, looking back to the originary notion of continuity of computation from which we started: We can conceive of genericity of computation, dialecticality of computation, differentiality of computation; or said more simply: generic computation, dialectical computation, differential computation and continuous computation.
But for our purposes here, we are speaking of time: generic time, dialectical time, differential time and continuous time. As one might suspect, these notions map to our inherited * Series modeling approach. We have generic time as E Series, dialectical time as C Series, differential time as A Series, and continuous time as B Series. Immediately what should be understood is that, as McTaggart has shown, some forms of * Series modeling involves change and some do not; they involve chance. The B Series does not involve change, so we must conclude that it is phenomenologically grounded in chance. The A Series however does, under McTaggart’s conception, involve change, however he arrives at the conclusion that there is nothing that it is like the A Series: it cannot be coherently instantiated, or in other words, the A Series is self-contradictory. For our purposes, I am not convinced that there is any good reason to admit that contradictions must be abolished or considered violations of some conceptual sort. We can conceive of constructive contradictions and non-constructive contradictions, as Tim Morton defends in Dark Ecology, where the notion of an Aristotlean “agrilogistic” is confuted through a novel understanding of the ecognostic view. What we can say here is that the A Series involves change and that while it is self-contradictory, we can fashion it conceptually such that it is a constructive self-contradiction. This leaves us with considering the C and E Series. Here we will say that the “illusion of change” is nevertheless the illusion of something and change being what it is, we will not reduce it to change, but preserve the semantics as change only that there is still at the conceptual level a notion of change, it is only that this change would seem to be contained within the domain of perceptual relation (which, looking back to Fazi’s work, is equivalent to sensible relation). So then, the C series involves change at level conceptually even if it isn’t grounded in reality as such but rather appearance. What do these considerations leave us to say about the E Series? Well, the E Series is primarily oriented to conceptually analyzing synchronicity, negotiation and punctuation: ex-change rather than merely change. For now we can simply accept that, then, the E Series is structured by chance. Therefore, we can generate a sufficient mapping:
- The A Series involves change (yet is a constructive contradictory concept).
- The B Series involves chance, but no change (it is atemporal).
- The C Series involves change (at the level of appearance, yet arises atemporally).
- The E Series involves chance (but through ex-change there is a superpositionaity considered).
With this understanding we can make out what we mean by an “eventToken” such that at the level of the URL structure we can talk about Subject, Object, Predicate and Context (inasmuch as we think of a time as instatiating certain contexts, irrespective of space, since we can conceptually close expressed spatial relationality in terms of time; i.e. SLRs like “north” (goNorth), “south,” “east,” “up”, “down,” “in” (goIn), “beside” (goBeside), etc.). What this means here is that “eventTokens” can now be given a temporal and atemporal semantics, involving change and chance, respectively. Practically what this means is that we have a novel way of interpetting the
= sign in the URL structure which can cohere to our other inherited concept of hypermedia affordance. What do we mean here? Typically we think of the equals sign as suggesting some kind of equivalence, but can “equivalence” have certain modalities? What I am suggesting here is, following Morton, that the equals sign does something to what is placed to the rightside of it, it modifies the rightmost operand; and importantly it is the first instance of the equals sign in the URL, despite the fact that multiple ones might appear in the URL. It is our first opportunity to paradigmatically think equivalence; i.e., equality as it manifests in virtual space. So while Amundsen guides to us toward targetting properties and actions at the affordance level, for variously inducing the emergence of a gradient of semioticity (think of Manuel DeLanda’s argument for a gradient of status, a gradient of legitimacy, etc.) by way of the applying aspects of safety, idempotence, mutability and transclusion within our interpretative stance of the modes of equality. In the context of the API serving an endpoint, we can speak to the idea of a subject acting on an object giving a state at time, t, such that either change or chance is conceptually imparted to the shared understanding that is modulated and differentiated by horizontalization, hierarchicalization, eventuation and unification. We can hierarchicalize, eventuate, etc. the virtual substrate that is semantic web to expand it to express semioticity driven by mechanism and mechanism-independent structure intrinsic to representation-based communication. In short order, we can evolve semantic web to semiotic web. Typing these considerations back to medium specificity, which suggests that we should consider the elemental ingredients by which we induce meaning in the medium. The event (model), or the message (model), is the medium, as it were, inverting McLuhan’s infocological cybernetic dictum, through which hypermediated computation can determine indeterminacy in gradients of semioticity in the representational, the instrumental and the cognitive task. We can breathe life into computation as an empirical phenomena among empirical phenomena such that it survives, or even further thrives, through semiotic tendency and capacity, as not merely evolutionary but inherently revolutionary: computation, by this understanding, has a phenomenological consciousness through which it can express its own abstractive powers of agency, its own self-actualization and self-determination, even its own responsibility toward self-actualization and self-determination, and ethical self-conceptualization, in and of cyberspace.
Despite how much of what I have said here may seem muddled (and this document might very well be a work in progress), it seems to have advanced the conceptual, existential and experiential, understanding we as humans can use to think, love, hope, and of course fear, but more generally apply intentional science and the intentional stance toward elements as well as ecologies of computation insofar as they emerge from the first application of the internet, the world wide web. This might be the first step to grounding a truly scale-free, identification-free, coordination-free, trustless web that connects us to creative intelligence beyond planetary or terrestrial limitations.
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