Non-Marxists, vulgar Marxists, genteel Marxists: generating the future through a non-critique of critiques
I was going to Galileo-stylize Two Chief Worlds this topic with a mapping of Marxiati (as non-Marxist), Marxedo (as vulgar Marxist), Marxicio (as Genteel Marxist), but that would probably perturb any genuine or meaningful analysis, but I’ll leave it to the reader to hash out whether such a mapping is possible at all given the contextual dissimilarities and contentions/problematics of applying presentism. To say the least, my initial mapping was inspired by the idea that Non-Marxism is inspired by François Laruelle’s “science of philosophical Decision” which attempts to drain Marxism of any dialectic, replacing it with a concept of superposition. To my mind, that immediately tells of a Salviati who would appeal to the status of instrumentation first and foremost, and so a non-Marxist who would, pace Heidegger who claims that “science does not think”, place thinking not only as a proper category of science but further “wants the autonomy of its manner of thinking the real”. Anyway, that’s some background to this discussion.
So recently I made a comment to the effect that Laruelle’s “non-marxist application of marxism” has something to say relating to the distinctions and intellectual in-fighting between Marxists, not only of treatment of bodies (vulgar) and languages (genteel), “except but also truths” (Laruelle), which would indicate a question of how they see themselves: the critique of critiques. One might even say that the position I’ve implied, said cheekily, is an attempt at a non-critique of critiques, or minimally seeking to conceive how one may reliably to verify these categories of the orientations of Marxists taking positionalities and how they see themselves through each others’ practices. In one way, the task of inquiry first starts with how the “immortal science” may be viewed from Laruelle’s “generic condition” of humanity: that calls for the underdetermination of the human, rather than overdetermination, which implies a generic insufficiency from which humans act as supplying their formulation of humanity-without-humanism, ultimately a kind of personhood altogether radicalized in its force-of-thought, leaving no one illegal, as it were. To say the least, Laruelle strikes the chord that any philosophical humanism has first a problem so as not to allow or privilege the embedding of one insufficiency to the exclusion or dismembering of others so as to prevent or crowd out, e.g., “identity-related claims of Indigenous peoples for recognition [which] are always bound up with demands for a more equitable distribution of land, political power, and economic resources” (Red Skin, White Masks. Glen Coulthard. p. 52. 2014).
Taking a step back, echoing Coulthard: the left-materialist analysis leaves us who speak from the afro-pessimist and indigenous futurism perspective (which both, in a way, collapse past-present-future into a absolitized formation of an a-temporal ethics), that analysis leaves a wanting for a space of reasons from which the “subaltern” speaks as it is presupposed or prefigured by “orienting metaphors” such as those demanded through temporality (“time is money”), templexity (as conceived by accelerationists), and from the Marxist intellectual tradition that the “speaking implement” and so too the “market speaks” such that “this speech tends to involve something more than one would expect of any mere mortal” (Can the Market Speak? Campbell Jones. Chapter 5. 2013). Surely the first contention might be from a perspective or orientation hyperreality, or the “more real than real”, we might want to understand if the market necessarily excludes the subaltern as we conceive them within the space of reasons subtended by our “grounded normativity” (Coulthard. p. 53.), which for the indigenous identitarian conditioning of performativity depends on a “place-based foundation” (Coulthard). That is to say, from a Laruellean perspective, what is performed-without-performation, the identity of practice, insofar as casting, cloning, etc. exist in reality as acts performative and constative determined-in-the-last-instance which realize “the liberation of practice outside of every operation or transcendence assumed as first” (Principles of Non-philosophy. François Laruelle. p. 295. 2013.).
As what I’ve said is really only initial, inchoate, a gathering of thoughts, I’ll leave with this: